马立诚 以人类之爱化解历史恩怨——纪念中日邦交正常化45周年 60
美国东西方研究所 美中关系中的“另类”战略认知 70
艾薇塔·斯米克（德国） 古巴的经济模式正在“与时俱进”——这会为它与欧盟之间的合作带来什么? 75
欧盟安全问题研究所 可以设想的危机：在2017年不可预测，在2020年无法管控? 102
马龙闪 百年十月革命史学流派概观——兼谈普京统一历史教科书对十月革命的书写 137
裴毅然 越南的“胡风案”与反右运动 155
Content of Issue 77 of the Magazine Leaders
9 Sino-U.S. Symposium on Counter-Terrorism
60 Healing Historical Wounds with Love of Humanity
70 “Alternative” Strategic Perceptions in U.S.-China Relations
75 Cuba “Updates” Its Economic Model: Perspectives for Cooperation with the European Union
102 What if … Conceivable Crises: Unpredictable in 2017, Unmanageable in 2020?
137 Review of Strands in Historiography of October Revolution
155 Vietnam’s “Hu Feng Case” and Anti-Rightist Movement
Summary of Issue 77 of the Magazine Leaders
“Alternative” Strategic Perceptions in U.S.-China Relations
On almost every major issue relating to security within the Northeast Asian theater—the arena in which U.S. and Chinese interests tend to intersect, and collide, most prolifically—sharply diverging strategic perceptions are a key element, perhaps the defining element, of the divergence in policy postures between the United States and China. The broad construct of “alternative facts” (and narratives and realities), frequently discussed in the U.S. domestic political context in recent months, is also at work in U.S.-China relations. The United States and China apply starkly different perceptual lenses to virtually most of the contentious issues on their docket, often leading to very different understandings of what even the facts themselves are. These distinct lenses and the opposing perceptions they generate, in turn, contribute to bilateral misunderstanding, mistrust and broad mutual strategic suspicion.
Cuba “Updates” Its Economic Model: Perspectives for Cooperation with the European Union
Foreign investors weigh up very carefully whether an investment will be worthwhile, especially in view of the small size of the Cuban market. Havana can only succeed in attracting more investment if the state’s control over private-sector decisions is relaxed. Options such as administrative steering of investment and obligatory technology transfer are open to a country like China because investors are keen to engage on account of the enormous Chinese domestic market. Cuba, on the other hand, is so small that it will have to bend much more strongly to international conditions if it is to become an attractive investment location in the long-term.
What if ... Conceivable Crises: Unpredictable in 2017, Unmanageable in 2020?
Strategic foresight and scenario-building may help us challenge ingrained ways of thinking about how we would deal with a range of grey swan situations. In this sense, Warren Buffett was partly right when he stated that ‘forecasts may tell you a great deal about the forecaster; they tell you nothing about the future’. The point about the kind of grey swan scenarios found in this report is that they can help challenge existing intellectual, institutional and/or material responses to crises. They can also help us think about how crises may be prevented or averted. When reading this report the immediate question that should come to mind is not ‘could that really happen?’ but rather ‘would we be prepared to deal with it if it did occur?’.